UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

GEORGE GARVEY, ADAM BIANCO, : 23-CV-517(KAM) ANTHONY FIGUEROA, CURTIS CUTLER, DALE NICHOLLS, DANIEL HULKOWER, FRANK CALAMANCO, JAMES GERMANO, : United States Courthouse KOLA SMITH, MANDEL BAILEY, : Brooklyn, New York MITCHUM GREENE, PATRICIA BUCCELLATO, RALPH MARTINEZ, RUSSELL PIAZZA, SEAN ABELL, THOMAS LIBRETTI.

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Thursday, April 6, 2023 12:30 P.M.

Plaintiffs.

-against-

ERIC ADAMS, AND THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

Defendants.

TRANSCRIPT OF PRE-MOTION CONFERENCE BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDGE KIYO MATSUMOTO

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiffs: LAW OFFICE OF CHAD J. LAVEGLIA

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs -

GEORGE GARVEY, ADAM BIANCO, ANTHONY FIGUEROA, CURTIS CUTLER, DALE NICHOLLS, DANIEL HULKOWER, FRANK CALAMANCO, JAMES GERMANO, KOLA SMITH, MANDEL BAILEY,

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ABELL, THOMAS LIBRETTI 350 Motor Parkway, Ste 308 Hauppauge, New York 11788 BY: CHAD LAVEGLIA, ESQ.

For the Defendants: NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT

2 OFFICE OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL Attorney for the Defendants ERIC ADAMS, AND THE CITY OF NEW YORK 100 Church Street New York, [!STATE2] 10007 BY: DAVID VICTOR HOLMES, ESQ. Official Court Reporter: ToniAnn Lucatorto, RPR, RMR, CRR Telephone: (718) 613-2601 E-mail: ToniAnnLucatorto@gmail.com Proceedings recorded by computerized stenography. Transcript produced by Computer-aided Transcription.

(In open court.)

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THE COURT: This is the pre-motion conference for Garvey versus City of New York. 22 civil 517. Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Chad LaVeglia, has just appeared. And who do we have for the defendant, please?

MR. HOLMES: David Holmes from the Office of the Corporation Counsel, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

Counsel, if I can just ask you please remember to identify yourself when you speak so we know who is speaking. We have a court reporter who is making a transcript of today's conference. So, as you know, the defendants have asked to dismiss the lawsuit. Given that there is a pending previously filed Article 78 proceeding in state court that, except for a few defendants, is identical to the case pending in federal court. And the defense wishes to dismiss because there is not -- it's not appropriate to file two lawsuits and put them on parallel tracks in state and federal court and see which lawsuit yields the results that the parties seek. The defendants make a compelling argument that the article 78 proceeding could have entertained any or all of the claims that are currently pending before this court. The parties. Except for the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and the commissioner are otherwise the And the Second Circuit has held for a long time now

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that if claims arised out of the same factual grouping, they are deemed to be part of the same cause of action, and a later claim will be barred in that regard to whether its based on theories or seeks different additional relief.

This is versus BMC Mortgage, Inc. 737 Federal Appendix 573.

Citing an older Second Circuit case; Davidson versus

Kapuana. 792 F.2nd 275 decided in 1986.

Now, the other -- in front of you that the defendants have identified is that the selective enforcement theory of the plaintiff's case, if one were to reach the merits, does not state a claim because the Second Circuit, again, requires that there be facts, plausible facts, and ultimately proof that a plaintiff must show that he, compared with other similarly situated, was selectively treated, and the selective treatment was motivated with the intention to discriminate on the basis of race, religion, national origin, sex or some other factor -- exercise the constitutional right and that there be -- bad faith on the part on the defendant's with an intent to injure the plaintiff.

So those facts are absent from the complaint. It appears that the plaintiff's, although it's theory it's certainly not supportable by any law that they're comparing private sector to City employees and arguing that private sector employees should constitute a group, a comparative

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Pre-Motion Conference 5 Which, frankly, the law just doesn't support. 1 aroup. 2 claim, if it's to proceed, has to depend on an unequal, 3 selective enforcement based on, as I said, race, religion, 4 etcetera. So let me ask Mr. LaVeglia, would you like to be 5 6 I got your letter, but would you like to be heard? 7 MR. LAVEGLIA: Yes, your Honor. Chad LaVeglia, 8 again, for plaintiff. I do understand the Res judicata 9 argument if I may address that first. According to Marcel 10 Fashions Group, Inc, the Lucky Brand Dungarees, 11 D-U-N-G-A-R-E-E-S, from the Circuit in 2015 Res judicata 12 does not apply where there's a continuation of the same 13 course of conduct. So here, even though the plaintiffs did 14 prevail in an Article 78 in lower court, Eric Adams 15 continued to enforce the vaccine mandate for months and 16 beyond that date. And so a continuing course beyond the 17 original claim that was in state court. 18 THE COURT: Well, wasn't the state court 19 addressing that issue? 20 MR. LAVEGLIA: Well, it couldn't have been 21 addressed because the conduct occurred after. After the 22 Court made the ruling, the Mayor still continued to enforce 23 this vaccine mandate. 24

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you. Did all of the plaintiffs lose their jobs because of their vaccine mandate

or did they invoke any of the procedures that were typical of other municipal employees?

MR. LAVEGLIA: Well, the lower court or the state court ordered the City to reinstate them, but the City appealed, and pursuant to the CPLR, there's no automatic stay on that portion of the order.

THE COURT: Well, there's no reason for me to go forward if that case is that far along.

MR. LAVEGLIA: I understand, your Honor.

THE COURT: I mean, it just it's not appropriate for plaintiff's to go to two different forums; state and federal, and proceed along parallel tracks. You first chose state court, you got a good result there, you're waiting an appeal. But the federal court is not going to step into the middle of a state court adjudicated matter. Or assert its jurisdiction. I don't think it would be appropriate when there is a pending appeal.

MR. LAVEGLIA: I happen to agree, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I'll hear from the defense because they can -- this is their motion. And I'm happy to hear from them.

MR. HOLMES: David Holmes from the Office of the Corporation Counsel. With regard to the claim of a continuing violation, the defendants believe that does not hold merits for the very reasons that were offered by the

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plaintiff's, which is, that when the case was appealed, results in statutory stay in the reinstatement process as portions of the order. Which is why there would have been a continuation of the enforcement of such a mandate. So it would have been as a result of that appeals process. And there should not be considered a continuing violation.

Moreover, the case cited by plaintiffs involved an instance in which both parties settled and come to a complete resolution, and then the violations continued. In this case, we are still ongoing in litigation by both the plaintiff and your Honor.

THE COURT: You're saying that Marcel Fashions

Group caved? Is that the one you're referring to as having reached a settlement?

MR. HOLMES: Yes. That was my understanding, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So Mr. LaVeglia, you have to -- I just want to ask you how you want to proceed? I don't know whether there are any facts that you can allege regarding the claim that the City took selective, you know, enforcement against you. Your clients. Are there any facts? I mean , do you want to amend your pleading to see if you can put facts in that would make out an equal protection claim based on race, religion, gender, you know.

MR. LAVEGLIA: Well, if I may, your Honor. I do

think that there is a strong case for the selective enforcement. I mean, we're talking about a virus that was present everywhere that public people gathered or people gathered in public. I mean, the Supreme Court in NFIB V. OSHA acknowledged that. That places of employment are not any different than any other public place and they shouldn't be treated any differently. And by making or ordering just city employees to get vaccinated, and only city employees, it's irrational and arbitrary. And then taking away their livelihood is evidence of bad faith. I mean, the Mayor is a

THE COURT: Sir, I understand the argument and it's a sympathetic one, but I'm talking about the law. Equal protection requires that the law is being applied and based on and because of race, religion, sex, national origin, etcetera.

lifelong public servant. He knows that these are careers.

They're not just temporary jobs.

Do you want an opportunity to amend your pleading to make out facts regarding an appropriate equal protection action?

MR. LAVEGLIA: Your Honor, I don't think so because I believe that it would be improper for me to proceed forward, considering the strength of the Res judicata conduct.

THE COURT: So are you saying you're going to

dismiss this case?

MR. LAVEGLIA: Yes. I don't believe there would be a good faith basis to go forward, considering the strength of the res judicata, and the state proceedings are ongoing. And as counsel said, and correctly so, there was an automatic stay. So even if it was continuous, it doesn't really matter. Because the Mayor was not bound by the -- as a result of the automatic stay.

THE COURT: Did they rescind the vaccine mandate some time ago?

MR. LAVEGLIA: He did in, I believe it was February. The beginning of February.

THE COURT: Okay. And was the case already stayed by then?

MR. LAVEGLIA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So if I -- if you are going to withdraw your case in the federal court and proceed in state court, I think what I'd like to do is either get your consent on behalf of all of your clients that you're dismissing this case with prejudice. Because you have a pending state court case. Or if you get a stipulation, but I think your -- some of your clients are on the phone. I don't know which ones. I know at least one gentleman did identify himself. But my point is is that you do have the ability to authorize the dismissal. But I want to make sure

Pre-Motion Conference 10 that your clients have cleared with you and given your 1 2 permission to dismiss the federal case with prejudice. 3 Can you make that representation to me as an 4 officer of court? MR. LAVEGLIA: I cannot at this moment. I would 5 like to speak with them first, if I may. 6 7 THE COURT: All right, that's a good idea. So let's do this. I will order that you talk to your clients, 8 9 the main plaintiffs here. George Garvey, Adam Bianco, 10 Anthony Figueroa, Curtis Cutler, Dale Nicholls, Daniel Hulkower, Frank Calamanco, James Germano, Kola Smith, Mandel 11 Bailey, Mitchum Greene, Patricia Buccellato, Ralph Martinez, 12 13 Russell Piazza, Sean Abell, and Thomas Libretti. 14 As an officer of the court, if you get all of your consent to dismiss, you should represent that in a 15 16 stipulation of dismissal that you are dismissing on behalf of all the plaintiffs. Alternatively, if the defense wants 17 18 this, each of the named plaintiffs can sign the stipulation 19 of dismissal with you also. On the stip about that. 20 So let me ask Mr. Holmes: What would you feel 21 most comfortable with at this point? 22 MR. HOLMES: Yes. David Holmes from the Office of 23 The Corporation Counsel. So I think it would be probably 24 most efficient if plaintiff's counsel could speak to all of

his clients and if then issue one singular stipulation to

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1	the Court. But we're happy to get all of the signatures of
2	all of the plaintiffs, if that happens to be more efficient.
3	THE COURT: Usually when an attorney appears for a
4	client and would takes any action his or her behalf, his
5	actions will bind the client. But I want to make sure that
6	all of the plaintiffs understand that this federal case will
7	be dismissed with prejudice. Meaning, you can't come back
8	to federal court with this claim because you've got
9	identical claims pending in the state court and you
10	succeeded. So all right. Were you going to say something,
11	sir?
12	MR. LAVEGLIA: Sorry, Chad LaVeglia for plaintiff.
13	I would be able to speak with everybody and we've all been
14	on the same page, so when I explain it to them, I would be
15	able to get their individual consent.
16	THE COURT: All right. So let's ask that you
17	submit stipulation of dismissal no later than and then
18	Mr. Holmes will have to sign it as well. How much time do
19	you need? A week or two?
20	MR. LAVEGLIA: A week, your Honor.
21	THE COURT: Just one week, all right. I'm giving
22	you until Friday, April 14th. Is that all right?
23	MR. LAVEGLIA: Yes, your Honor.

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THE COURT: So stipulation of dismissal will be

submitted with prejudice by Friday, April 14th. All right.

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Pre-Motion Conference All right. Thank you. And Mr. Holmes, you should also keep track just to make sure that you get that stip in time so that it can be uploaded to the docket by the 14th. MR. HOLMES: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel. And thank you for all of the plaintiffs that joined us today. Have a good day. (Proceeding concluded.)